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Abstract 
From the 19th century, the biography has stood at the heart of the 
Western historical enterprise. The ‘great men’ of history have been 
valorised as the sources of change in the world. Yet, biography has 
equally been decried as ahistorical and elitist, leading to its 
widespread abandonment, by the second half of the 20th century, as 
a means of understanding and relating historical change. In the 
1970s and 1980s approaches to biography attempted to restore its 
sense of political purpose and its academic reputation - with mixed 
results. However, in the past ten years theoretical attempts to 
reintroduce the notion of individual agency to history, and the 
emergence of works that successfully navigate the boundary 
between history and biography, have demonstrated the latter 
genre’s validity as a means of historical analysis. This paper 
argues that these recent developments, when complemented by the 
historicisation of the Western biographical genre attempted here, 
show that the biography can make a valid contribution to the 
history, though not for the reasons given by both its traditional 
champions and its radical critics. 
This paper has been peer reviewed 
Much like the extraordinary individuals traditionally claimed as its 
subjects, the biography in history has endured mixed fortunes. 
From a position of pre-eminence in historical writing in the 19th 
and early 20th century, the ‘great men’ of history were sidelined by 
the efforts of social history, which refused them their primacy as 
the motivators of historical change and, in so doing, repudiated 
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biography’s claim to be ‘real’ history. This was not the last 
indignity the ‘great men’ suffered: in the 1970s and 1980s post-
structural theories questioned their very existence as coherent 
subjects of study, diminishing the possibility of their use even as 
solely narrative devices. Yet these same postmodern imperatives 
and techniques allowed feminist historians to go some way towards 
rehabilitating the biographical genre. However in ultimately 
conforming to the ‘plot’ and prerogatives of the Western 
biographical model, such works can still claim only limited 
historicity. With the development of new theoretical approaches to 
not only biography, but the problem of individual agency in 
history, along with the historicisation of biography as a Western 
phenomenon with its roots in 19th century conceptualisations of the 
individual and his worth, biography can, ultimately, be reinstated as 
a valuable means of historical analysis. 
 The historiography of biographical writing shows how academic 
history has understood its relationship to the individual life story 
and also, by extension, how historians have conceived of and 
responded to the notion of individual agency. The incredulity with 
which historians often regard biographical endeavours exposes the 
limits of their belief in human agency as a source of historical 
change. For the purposes of this article, ‘history’ refers to an 
admittedly conservative definition of the discipline. As we shall see 
this definition is by no means uncontested; similarly, biography has 
a diversity of purposes beyond the explanation of historical 
change.1 However, taking on academic historians’ challenge on 
their own terms and claiming biography as a means of ‘proper’ 
historical analysis can, perhaps, finally rebuff the glib but persistent 
argument that biography’s focus on the personal precludes it from 
real value as historical analysis.  
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Accepting this limited understanding of what ‘counts’ as 
history effects the bifurcation of the question of the historicity of 
biography. In asking, does the individual matter to history? we ask 
if a focus on the individual biographical subject can be justified as 
anything apart from a narrative device, or a pedagogical or political 
statement. This leads to a second question: does the individual 
matter to the past? By establishing the latter, the former can be 
affirmed: if individuals did effect real historical change, then 
biography can make claims on history. Only lately, however, have 
historians come some way towards successfully doing so. By 
recognising how the individual’s experience and comprehension of 
the world informs their actions, historians have lately sought to 
restore the validity of the individual as a historical actor. In so 
doing, they have also found a justification for the use of individuals 
as subjects of history. This justification is not only more credible 
than the blasé assertions of uncompromised agency typical of much 
older and some contemporary political biography, as explored 
below. It also addresses the elisions of more recent, and at first 
appearances more radical, biographical traditions that in their 
implicit diminishment not only of the subject’s agency, but the 
existence of that subject itself, compromise their political claims 
and purposes. 
In the early modern age, history was largely seen as that of 
the individual and his2 actions in the world. A materialist view of 
the individual in history is neatly summarised in Thomas Carlyle’s 
1840 dictum: ‘Universal History, the history of what man has 
accomplished in the world, is at bottom the History of the Great 
Men who have worked here’.3 The figuring of the individual as the 
primary subject of historical study also derived from an idealist 
perspective: Hegel posited the ‘great men’ of history as agents of 
the Weltgeist, apprehending the next stage in human progress and 
leading the world into that future: 
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The great individuals of world history ... are the far-sighted 
ones: they have discerned what is true in their world and in their 
age, and have recognized the concept, the next universal to 
emerge.4  
This is not only a claim on how the past works. It is also an implicit 
justification for the study of the individual as a historical subject 
and using him as a means of explaining events, and the essence, of 
his times. The western world’s philosophical individualism, and 
belief in the capacity for self-creation outside of contextual 
constraints, informed such views and laid the foundations for a 
continuing biographical tradition.5 For instance, it has been 
suggested that the lineage of Weberian notions of ‘charisma’ and 
charismatic domination finds its origins in the European poetic cult 
of Napoleonic genius.6 Nietzsche, meanwhile, among 19th century 
figures who venerated the heroic individual, distinguished that man 
from his obvious and oft-cited classical precursors with a new 
emphasis on his ‘aristocratic self-assertion’, as opposed to his 
acting out of a social role.7 Also for this reason, in the 19th and 
early 20th centuries biography was seen as a way through which the 
nation could understand itself and affectionately contemplate the 
achievements of its ‘notable’ inhabitants as exemplified, with some 
qualification, by the early editions of the British Dictionary of 
National Biography.8 The ‘great men’ were the rightful 
representatives and embodiments of the modern nations. Even the 
'new biography' of the early 20th century, a movement exemplified 
by titles like Lytton Strachey's Eminent Victorians, while taking a 
decidedly less hagiographical tone, did not question its forebears 
assumption of the individual life’s capacity to express the principle 
ideals of its age.9 Apart from its historical explanatory purpose, we 
cannot forget, either, the pedagogical purposes of the 19th century 
biography: like the hagiographies to which this traditional 
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biography owed a debt, authors claimed a morally instructive 
purpose to their endeavours.10  
This tradition persists. Robert Rotberg’s recent defence of 
biography as a means of historical analysis amounts, in the end, to 
a defence of the methodology of the biographer as akin to that of 
the historian.11 However, just because a biographer is well-versed 
in historical scholarship, it does not follow that his or her biography 
is history. Rotberg elides the significant problems posed to 
biography in the 20th century through his conservative and 
predictable choice of subjects. He acknowledges these as ‘obvious’. 
For instance Cecil Rhodes, Rotberg writes, stood ‘at the center of 
every conceivable colonial southern African web’, making him the 
ideal biographical subject. Rotberg assumes acts of agency as the 
principal determinants of such individual’s fates, and their later 
consecration within the historical and biographical canon. For 
instance Rhodes, Rotberg writes, mobilised a ‘legion of followers’, 
despite having an ‘unprepossessing demeanor, a rambling manner, 
a high-pitched squeaky voice, and no unusual conventional 
intellectual abilities or attainments’.12 These infirmities suggest, 
perhaps, something outside of Rhodes himself that enabled his 
achievements; nonetheless Rotberg privileges Rhodes’ personal 
achievements ahead of structural determinants, his capacity to ‘alter 
destiny’ emerging as the key criterion for determining individual 
historical significance. 
I emphasise this example because of what it reveals about 
the persistence of old traditions in biography and, more broadly, 
Western academic and narrative traditions. This persistence of the 
‘heroic life’ as a narrative mode and an object of popular 
veneration, as exemplified by Rotberg’s writing and defence of 
biography may, itself, be usefully historicised. As Featherstone 
writes, the lionisation of history’s heroes in itself signifies the 
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incomplete nature of the 20th century project to consecrate and 
legitimise ‘everyday life’, as attempted, for instance, by the social 
sciences and social historical traditions. This critique originated in 
Marx’s materialist inversion of Hegelian idealism which, like 
traditional biography, posited men as agents of historical change. 
However, Marx’s advocacy of the individual in history came with a 
crucial qualification, as expressed in The Eighteenth Brumaire of 
Louis Bonaparte: 
Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they 
please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but 
under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from 
the past.13 
Marxist materialism and its associated emphasis on the 
circumstantial determinants of individual actions proved the 
undoing of the ‘great men’ as viable subjects of historical study. By 
the mid-20th century the respective political and epistemological 
claims of ‘history from below’ and social history challenged the 
individual’s privileged position in history. As Peter Stearns writes, 
this loose movement of scholars was underpinned by two central 
premises: ‘that ordinary people not only have a history but 
contribute to shaping history more generally, and that a range of 
behaviors can be profitably explored historically beyond (though 
also including) the most familiar political staples’.14 Social 
history’s recognition of the ‘small’ men, and women, of history 
undermined the implicit elitism of political history, and of 
historical biography that valorises the individual and either severs 
him from his social context, or claims him as its master. Further, 
social history’s weighting towards a structurally deterministic 
outlook, or at least a focus on collective action as the underlying 
force of history, displaced the ‘great men’ from their position as the 
primary agents of historical change. Lawrence Stone, in a novel 
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conceptualisation, saw this as the, albeit temporary, victory of 
structural history, with its analytic impetus and institutional focus, 
over the older tradition of narrative history, which valorises ‘man 
not circumstances’.15 Francois Furet saw the downfall of the 
individual in history, similarly, as originating in academic history’s 
vast borrowing from social science initiated by the Annales School, 
its historiographical reflection found in the demise of political 
history: 
It is in the study of politics, of human choice, that history best 
expresses its capacity to create and to constitute the arena for 
the study of man … the price paid by history for remodelling 
itself on the pattern of the social sciences is that it focuses 
primarily on what underlies those choices, on what determines 
them and what makes them inevitable despite the appearance of 
freedom.16 
Thus, the reorientation of academic history’s focus towards the 
institutional, social, and economic left the individual by the 
wayside.17 The individual came no longer to matter to the past and, 
therefore, not to history, either. 
However social history’s early confidence in an objective 
and totalising understanding of the past and its inhabitants was 
shared by the older biographical tradition. This meant that though 
the individual no longer had a role to play in the creation of history 
he or she retained some value, as an illustration of historical 
processes at work, in the historian’s assured attempt at relating the 
past in its totality. Yet there was still worse to come for historical 
biography, even following this reduction of the individual to mere 
decoration on the superstructure of the past. The ‘linguistic turn’ in 
history questioned the very existence of a coherent, individual 
‘self’ to exemplify and explain historical processes. The related 
arguments of post-structuralism, cultural history and gender history 
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dissolved this idea of a unitary ‘self’, unchanging through time and 
unaffected by the perceptions of others. It became impossible, as 
traditional, specifically political, biography would have it, for the 
historian to ‘order an individual’s life with an origin, logic, 
purpose, and outcome, and with a single, objective identity that can 
be narrated chronologically’.18 Similarly the post-structural assault 
on the historian’s capacity to understand the material reality 
inhabited by the individual agent rendered his or her historical 
context itself an invention. The twin effect of the dissolution of the 
individual personality, and the denial of his or her knowable and 
communicable material context, was to make the individual 
historical actor at best the product of naïve imagination, at worst of 
narrow bourgeois individualism.19  
However the post-structural criticism of historians’ 
assumptions about material reality enabled the emerging disciplines 
of women’s and gender studies to stake their claim on the 
biographical field and partially rehabilitate the study of the 
individual as an academic pursuit. Scholars came to focus on how 
individuals experienced their historical worlds, rather than how 
they constituted them. Feminist scholars’ acknowledgement of a 
lack of ‘fixity’ of self in the past led to new emphasis on the 
performative aspects of individual identity, now seen as salient, not 
suspect, because analysis of the ‘performance’ of identity could 
reveal its historical, contextual determinants.20 To this end, it 
sought both to illuminate the personal and subjective in history, and 
show how individuals can be re-inserted into general histories, 
because, for example, women’s experience could be seen as 
‘prisms for observing shifts in the gendering of their worlds’.21 
Here, it should also be noted that this new biography is but a part of 
the broader feminist biographical ‘movement’, and that their 
respective methodologies and epistemological assumptions are not, 
necessarily, one and the same – for instance, the new biography’s 
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focus on the discursive is shared, but not so strongly emphasised, 
by other feminist biography that owes a greater, acknowledged debt 
to social history; and vice versa. Nonetheless, in each taking 
‘gender’ as their means of analysis, and gender politics as the 
purpose of their historical explanation, these two different but not 
mutually exclusive movements often intersect and, thus, can be 
discussed together. To that end the intellectual scaffolding on 
which feminist biography, in all its forms, rests its claims on 
historicity is not so convincing. While its interrogation of the 
individual, to provide a means of observing historical change 
proved valuable, feminist biography is not so effective in re-
establishing the importance of the individual actor to the past; that 
is it say, it makes little concrete, convincing claim on individual 
agency and its effectiveness in generating historical change.  
In this respect much the same arguments that undermined 
old-fashioned political biography, most successfully by social 
historians, can be marshalled here against feminist biography. In 
her historiographical review of contemporary work on individual 
women’s lives, Susan Ware cedes ground to the contextual 
determinants of individual behaviour, positing her biographical 
subject as ‘a window on a wider vista’.22 Yet one must also ask if 
the historian is attempting to explain broader historical processes, 
changes and continuities, why then use the cipher of the individual 
life and risk distorting that broader historical picture with the undue 
privileging of the individual agent? For narrative purposes, 
perhaps; more cynically, the abiding commercial and popular 
interest in the life and times of the great or the iconoclastic may 
account for this. Ware concedes this point. She argues biography is 
history when the two intersect. Biography, however, enhances 
history by reaching for a broad, non-scholarly audience. Ware, as 
others have done, criticises the ‘narrow vision’ of history. 
However, her and others’ attempts to reach beyond the parameters 
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of traditional academic history in no way accounts for history’s 
traditional criteria, narrow as they are. In the end it provides no 
satisfactory defence of material individual agency in the past, and 
therefore no defence of biography as a means of explaining 
historical change. Feminist biography’s political purpose, closely 
aligned with the emergence of social history and women’s history, 
is to establish that women’s lives are ‘no less historically important 
than men’s’.23 Yet its attention to the individual life seems at odds 
with the social history tradition it claims as its forebear, which 
looked to the lives, not the life, of the makers of history. The 
liberating potential of social history is not realised by biography 
that insistently positions its subject at the centre of the historical 
narrative. Without justifying that person’s singular importance to a 
social narrative of such a history, such biographies invite the 
accusation of historical distortion. In this respect, political 
biographers like Rotberg are not the only inheritors of the 19th 
century tradition. Feminist biography, like the post-modernism in 
which it finds its roots, is complicit in this failure to truly 
democratise the life story. This complicity may account for the 
discrepancy between the democratic goals of the social history to 
which feminist history and biography owes a debt, and feminist 
biography’s own limited achievements. Its attribution of individual 
will and power to the previously unseen ‘makers’ of history, 
ultimately conforms to the heroic, inherently ‘masculine’ plot of 
individual triumph over the banality of everyday circumstances.24 
Feminist biography, rather than fulfilling the promise of a more 
democratic understanding of the course of individual and collective 
lives, in attempting to overturn the ‘male’ plot ultimately conforms 
to its norms and standards, and in so doing posits a vision of 
biography as history that is neither as radical, nor as convincing, as 
it first appears. 
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Post-structuralism moved the debate about the individual 
beyond the question of the material determinants of his or her 
personality and actions. ‘Discourse’ emerged as the key to 
understanding people and their behaviours. The most extreme 
arguments claimed the individual ‘self’ to be constituted by 
discourse alone. The discursive inflections of the new biography, 
that emphasises how the individual life, and personality, ‘can be 
altered to suit the times, the setting, and/or the demands of a 
particular audience’, nonetheless show the human subject to be 
beholden either to its material circumstance or its cultural moment, 
at best an attenuated claim on individual agency with serious 
academic and political implications.25 Ultimately, the new 
biography does not satisfactorily answer the implicit charge of its 
subjects’ passivity. Grounded in the understanding of the 
individual’s ‘performance’ as a response to cultural and social 
determinants, it can make at best a limited claim on historical 
agency. For instance, in positing Marilyn Monroe as an exemplar 
of such a post-structural ‘variegated’ identity, though one, in this 
case, at least in part of her own making, Lois Banner emphasises 
Monroe’s active role in the creation of major tropes of 1950s 
celebrity and femininity. This goes some way towards re-
establishing agency in the manufacture of discourse. It does not, 
however, full establish the material significance of the historical 
actor. In such a biographical treatment Monroe emerges, first and 
foremost, as the representative of history, not history’s maker. As 
Banner herself states, her interest is in subjects who ‘articulated 
cultural understandings, rather than individuals who followed or 
contested them’. This is not to disavow the importance of 
discursive analyses, or those that have looked to the ‘experience’ of 
history: these yield important insights about the past. However, not 
addressing the materiality of the past could potentially limit even 
the pedagogical usefulness of the work of historians like Banner. 
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Banner’s avowed purpose in writing biography is therapeutic as it 
is historical. Banner argues that empathy for the historical subject 
encourages her students to reflect on their own lives, and their own 
identities.26 It should be noted that in this respect her goal is not so 
dissimilar from the aims of the 19th century biographer who 
pursued a morally instructive purpose in biography; a purpose, 
historians may reasonably argue, inimical to true historical 
scholarship. More importantly, in saying that a subject, if she exists 
at all, has discursive implications alone gives an attenuated vision 
of human agency that could prove, if not counter-productive, then 
politically less than inspiring to those seeking to connect to and 
alter their material worlds. 
Yet while biographers like Rotberg assume men to be 
masters of their own fate and reputations, others have adopted a far 
more reflexive practise in the analysis of ‘great lives’. These 
programmes of rigorous contextualisation of the individual in 
history yield insights that may apply more broadly to biographical 
endeavours. Lucy Riall and Ian Kershaw each respectively look to 
the production of the subject’s reputation, both in his or her 
lifetime, and after as the key to revealing the social processes that 
produce the ‘great’ individuals of history and, in doing so, work to 
legitimise the biographical genre as historical, revealing as it is 
about the historical events and circumstances signified and 
encapsulated by their subjects’ reputations. In her biography of 
Giuseppe Garibaldi, Riall positions the idea of his ‘greatness’ at the 
centre of her analysis. In so doing, she examines how contemporary 
and historical perceptions and representations of Garibaldi as one 
of the ‘great men’ of history came as a result both of structural 
determinants (for instance, changes in technology and demography) 
and the contrivances of Italian liberals and Garibaldi himself.27 
Kershaw, from a position of outright scepticism of the idea of 
‘greatness’, similarly and expansively examined the dialectical 
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relationship between the historical actor, and historical context, to 
reveal not only the discursive ‘meanings’ of the individual, but how 
these meanings effect real, material change. Introducing his two-
volume biography of Adolf Hitler, Kershaw lays bare the problems 
of reckoning with the individual’s role in historical events. 
Kershaw’s Hitler provides a particularly salient example of how the 
individual can matter in history, because Kershaw’s biography 
stands at odds both with a historiographical tradition that has seen 
Hitler as either an exemplar of the ‘great man’, for better or worse, 
and one that has viewed him as the product of depersonalised 
historical processes. Kershaw denies the simplicity of an 
intentionalist view of Hitler as the sole agent of the Third Reich 
and its crimes, with its commensurate mystification of the role of 
German society in bringing him to power.28 More critically 
perceptive than a highly personalised history of Hitler is one that 
shows the ways in which political, social and cultural discourse 
contributed to ‘the making of Hitler’. Yet Kershaw does not refuse 
Hitler his historical particularity, and his personal role in the 
making of the Nazi epoch. He refutes blinkered structural 
determinism by posing several counterfactuals, hypothetically 
removing Hitler from his instrumental position within the Nazi 
Party, to conclude that ‘whatever the external circumstances and 
impersonal determinants, Hitler was not interchangeable’.29 The 
meeting of Adolf Hitler and a set of political, social, cultural, and 
economic conditions, although the latter structural determinants, 
Kershaw asserts, were more important than the man himself, 
produced both Hitler’s public character (the Führer) and in so 
doing created the historically particular conditions that determined 
the nature, and the course, of the Third Reich. 
The interrogation of history’s ‘great men’ has had its effect. 
They have been convincingly contextualised as actors on a stage 
not entirely of their own making. Their historical reputation 
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justifies their biographical interrogation and their historicisation. It 
is against their reputations as ‘great men’ that their biographers 
position these subjects, and the production of their reputation is 
then shown to have real historical effects. What, then, for the 
‘smaller’ players on the historical stage? Rotberg, like his forebears 
in political biography, has little time for the passive experience of 
history. As suggested earlier, the new biographers and feminist 
biographers pay that experience its due, but at the cost of that 
experience becoming history’s exemplar, not history itself. Without 
establishing the significance of the individual as an actor in the 
past, for these individuals there seems no way of justifying their 
biographical treatment without inviting the latter accusation. For 
instance, Rotberg’s dismissal of Laurel Thatcher Ulrich’s 
biographical treatment of the American midwife Martha Ballard as 
‘ahistorical’ can, and has been, answered by the expansion of 
history’s parameters.30 However to answer the problem in 
Rotberg’s own terms could definitively close the door on such 
implicitly elitist position on who ‘matters’ in history. 
In a critical comment on Geoff Eley’s A Crooked Line, 
which sought a renegotiation of the relationship between the 
apparently dichotomous social and cultural methodologies of 
history, Gabrielle Spiegel offers a new direction, or an 
identification of a new direction already being pursued by 
historians, that could reintroduce the individual as an effective 
agent in history. Tentatively labelling this approach ‘neo-
phenomenological’, Spiegel asserts that this new history would 
neither deny the individual’s role in the past, as in social history, 
nor disperse it, as post-structuralism and cultural history might do. 
Nonetheless she builds on the insights of both these movements to 
effectively reconceptualise individuals as historically important. 
Spiegel would see historians reinsert ‘the agent as an effective 
social actor … by highlighting the disjunction between culturally 
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given meanings and the individual uses of them in contingent, 
historically conditioned ways’. As such, Spiegel’s prescription 
moves beyond both the standard Marxian, materialist position and 
post-structural approaches that claim discourse as constitutive of 
the subject to place that subject as, if not the origin of historical 
change. Grounded in ‘a belief in individual perception as the 
agent’s own source of knowledge about, and action in, the world – 
a perception mediated and perhaps constrained but not wholly 
controlled by the cultural scaffolding or conceptual schemes within 
which it takes place’, the subject, by Spiegel’s reading, is not 
merely the vessal through which material and discursive forces act. 
As a distinct and irreducible character, the subject is empowered to, 
itself, work through these forces.31 Such recognition of the 
individual as an effective actor in the past, in its turn, could re-
establish the individual as a legitimate historical actor and a 
legitimate subject of history. This, however, does not amount to a 
demand for a return to old-style biography that sees the individual 
as either a principle motivator of historical change, or as having a 
merely metonymic value as expressing the character of his or her 
age. Rather, it proposes that the biographical approach to history 
should study the individual with reference to his or her social 
determinants, and his or her responses to society, in order to show 
the nexus between that person and his or her social context. This 
approach emphasises the subject’s experience of history, however, 
goes a step further in claiming how experience can inform the 
individual’s shaping of his or her future; that is to say, our past. 
Here we see the most concrete justification for the use of 
the individual life as a means of historical analysis beyond a 
narrative device. It is in this spirit that academic biography has 
enjoyed something of a renaissance in recent years. Contributors to 
the American History Review’s June 2009 discussion of biography 
wrote about a variety of projects to which a biographical approach 
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has proved fruitful, showing the newfound confidence of 
biographers in claiming their work as ‘real’ history. David Nasaw 
in his introduction stakes a new claim for the biographical genre. 
Nasaw readily cedes narrative and epistemological ground to the, 
mostly literary, critics of the historian-as-biographer, who accuse 
the historian of a failure to centre the individual subject. This, 
however, is not a failure; instead, Nasaw writes, ‘historians are not 
interested in simply charting the course of individual lives, but in 
examining those lives in dialectical relationship to the multiple 
social, political, and cultural worlds they inhabit and give meaning 
to’.32 In this way the individual is not used merely as a 
representative of his or her epoch, but identified as existing in a 
symbiotic relationship with his or her historical context, each 
effecting to generate the other. This model of ‘symbiosis’ might 
risk a simplistic and evasive generalisation of complex processes. 
However, Spiegel’s prescription presents a challenge of research to 
which the historian is particularly well suited. Precisely because of 
the general nature of Spiegel’s neo-phenomenological model the 
historian must pay close and rigorous attention to the specific and 
irreducible conditions of individual lives, allowing for their proper 
and convincing historical interpretation.  
However, while Spiegel’s conceptual reorientation of 
individual agency provides the backbone to future pursuits of the 
biographical subject, a number of historians have developed the 
methodological muscle necessary to proving biography’s worth as 
‘real’ history. Alice-Kessler Harris, in her work on the American 
playwright and activist Lillian Hellman demonstrates, in practice, a 
keen awareness of the agent’s crucial role in determining the 
historical trajectory of a given period. Kessler-Harris positions 
Hellman within a set of material and discursive circumstances. Yet 
even Kessler-Harris’ choice of words says a great deal about the 
active role Hellman took in her own life course, and the broader 
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world around her. Hellman, Kessler-Harris writes, engaged in 
‘contests’ with her social and political context, entering into a 
‘dialogue’ with 1950s America. In positioning her subject thus, 
Kessler-Harris posits Hellman as neither unduly heroic, nor as 
merely a viewpoint from which to look at impersonal historical 
change. In the end, Hellman provides a narrative device, but not 
unjustifiably, because her job is not just to ‘narrate’ historical 
processes; she is an actor in the drama of her life, and cannot be 
reduced to a function of either social processes or discourses of 
identity. The dichotomy, for instance, of Hellman’s achievements 
and the personal respect she commanded against her public infamy 
speaks to the ‘social meaning of a woman’s success story’, yet this 
‘social meaning’ is derived not only from outside perceptions of 
Hellman, but the action Hellman takes in her own life-course, often 
against the dominant discourses and circumstances of her age.33 
What Kessler-Harris calls a ‘grandiose’ statement is most 
interesting, but it should also be noted for its modesty: 
I think an individual life might help us to see not only into 
particular events but into the larger social and cultural and even 
political processes of a moment in time. (emphasis added)34 
In the end, the modesty of such claims in biography may be key to 
its flourishing as ‘real’ history. The centring of the individual 
subject, ahead of the collective, or structural, account of historical 
change, need not unduly prejudice history if it is balanced against 
other accounts of individual’s ‘neo-phenomenological’ responses 
and contributions to historical processes. In the same edition of the 
AHR, Jochen Hellbeck traces the contours of the Soviet 
autobiographical genre, wherein individuals were encouraged to 
write of their experience of the Marxist unfolding of history. 
Ironically these individual writers often revealed themselves not as 
mere subjects of that process, but in seizing control of their 
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experience and narration of history, staked a claim in the future, 
too. The commitment to tracing one’s life’s progress towards its 
teleological endpoint served to fill the Soviet citizens’ lives ‘with 
orientation, purpose, and power’. In this case, their claims on 
human agency in fact constituted enactments of that agency.35 
Hellbeck identifies a whole other historical lineage to the Soviet 
biography, which, in its emphasis on the collective experience as 
giving rise to that of the individual, and the need to assess history 
in terms of its collected parts, emerges as a counterpoint to the 
Western tradition that claims ‘individualism as its central 
ideological and animating force’. This individualism was the origin 
of modern biography and, looking back, even the most radical 
attempts to revolutionise the genre framed themselves in this same 
mode, prizing individual self-creation as the key qualification for 
biographical treatment. A more committedly ‘collectivist’ approach 
to life-writing may lead biography, at last, away from 
epistemological and narrative imperatives of the Western 19th 
century tradition; the imperative by which even its opponents have 
defined the value of their interventions in the genre. 
It is, in the end, possible to historicise the Western 
biographical ideal, as has been done here. The prerogatives of such 
biography have, however, lately found themselves out of step with 
the relentless charge towards recognition of broader processes, the 
significance of collective action, and the dubiousness of the 
possibility of a single, unitary human subject in the past and in 
biography.36 This problem cannot be resolved without the 
reconceptualisation of biography’s narrative mode, and its political 
and epistemological foundations and intentions. The individual 
cannot be erased from history altogether; Rotberg has a point when 
he writes that ‘individuals pull the levers of structure and act within 
or against cultural norms’.37 However agency should not and 
cannot be assumed and the demands of narrative do not justify the 
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centring of the individual at the expense of his or her broader 
historical context. Between them the ‘collectivist’ approach of 
Soviet biography, the insights of Spiegel’s neo-phenomenological 
approach, and the work of historians like Kessler-Harris in 
balancing the individual against his or her context in a dialectical 
relationship, may well provide the best way of negotiating the 
biography/history nexus. At extremes, this means the biographer of 
the famed individuals of history must be alive to the forces that 
produced their reputations, while for those pursuing the obscure 
biographical subject, close attention must be paid to the acts of 
agency through which they contributed to the making of the past. 
For the historian-biographer, understanding of the individual comes 
from understanding his or her contextual determinants and vice 
versa; the individual need not be either history’s passive observer 
nor its master. The individual matters in the past, because 
individual behaviour, derived from an individual’s apprehension of  
and immersion in the world, contributes to the changing shape of 
his or her society. This dialectical relationship between agent and 
structure demands and deserves untangling in academic history. 
One means of achieving this may well be biographical. 
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